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Pathogen sequence data have been exploited to infer who infected whom, by
using empirical and model-based approaches. Most of these approaches
exploit one pathogen sequence per infected host (e.g. individual, household,
field). However, modern sequencing techniques can reveal the polymorphic
nature of within-host populations of pathogens. Thus, these techniques pro-
vide a subsample of the pathogen variants that were present in the host at
the sampling time. Such data are expected to give more insight on epidemio-
logical links than a single sequence per host. In general, a mechanistic
viewpoint to transmission and micro-evolution has been followed to infer
epidemiological links from these data. Here, we investigate an alternative
approach grounded on statistical learning. The idea consists of learning
the structure of epidemiological links with a pseudo-evolutionary model
applied to training data obtained from contact tracing, for example, and
using this initial stage to infer links for the whole dataset. Such an approach
has the potential to be particularly valuable in the case of a risk of erroneous
mechanistic assumptions, it is sufficiently parsimonious to allow the hand-
ling of big datasets in the future, and it is versatile enough to be applied
to very different contexts from animal, human and plant epidemiology.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling infectious disease out-
breaks in humans, animals and plants: approaches and important themes’.
This issue is linked with the subsequent theme issue ‘Modelling infectious
disease outbreaks in humans, animals and plants: epidemic forecasting
and control’.
1. Introduction
In order to most effectively predict and control the spread of infectious diseases,
we need to better understand how pathogens spread within and between host
populations and assess the role of the environment in the transmissions. The
question how do pathogens spread? can be understood in many ways. Here, we
consider the case where we observe numerous host units infected by an ende-
mic or epidemic infectious disease, and the question of how do pathogens spread?
translates into who infected whom? or who is closely related to whom? in the disease
transmission dynamics. Host units typically designate individuals but can also
designate groups such as households, premises and agricultural fields.
For fast-evolving pathogens, numerous approaches exploiting pathogen
sequence data have been developed with the aim of inferring who infected
whom or who is closely related to whom. These approaches are grounded on a
wide variety of principles, from those based on statistical metrics to those
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2based on a mechanistic modelling of pathogen transmission
and micro-evolution. For instance, transmission links can be
inferred by identifying specific variants shared by different
hosts or minimizing differences in single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNP) [1–3], by combining minimal genetic
distances between intra-host viral populations and properties
of social networks relevant to pathogen spread [4], by apply-
ing methods based on phylogeny, phylogeography and
some forms of birth–death processes [5–14], or by using
methods based on joint models of epidemiological dynamics
and evolutionary processes [15–21]. Initially, model-based
approaches mostly exploited a single pathogen sequence per
host. Nevertheless, the progress of sequencing techniques
revealing the within-host genetic polymorphism of pathogens
fostered the development of model-based approaches
accounting for the generation of within-host diversity and/
or leveraging the information provided by sets of sequences
sampled from hosts [4–7,9,14,20].
Approaches based on a mechanistic vision of transmission
and micro-evolutionary processes are the most obvious direc-
tion to follow for inferring epidemiological links between
host units. Indeed, mechanistic assumptions underlying these
approaches act as relevant constraints, which are expected to
guide the inference. However, statistical learning techniques
[22] adapted to the inference of epidemiological links should
also be developed, in particular (i) when mechanistic assump-
tions could be inadequate and, therefore, misleading, (ii) when
sequence data do not accurately reflect the within-host patho-
gen population because of sequencing bias or errors and (iii)
when a fast method is required to tackle big datasets in terms
of number of hosts, sequencing depth and sequence length.
Here, we propose a statistical learning approach for esti-
mating epidemiological links from deep sequencing data
(called SLAFEEL), which is based on a parsimonious semi-
parametric pseudo-evolutionary model. This model
is designed as a regression function where the response
variable is the set of sequences S observed from a recipient
host unit and the explanatory variable is the set of sequences
S0 observed from a putative source. The coefficients of
the regression areweightsmeasuring howmuch each sequence
in S0 contributes to explaining each sequence in S. These
weights account for the gain and loss of virus variants
during within-host evolution and their loss during between-
host transmission. The model is semi-parametric because it
depends both on parameters and on a kernel smoother (a
tool from non-parametric statistics), which accounts for
unsampled sequences in the source of infection, the evolution
of new viral variants and potential sequencing errors. The
model is pseudo-evolutionary because, even if it does
not explicitly model evolutionary processes, it contains terms
that macroscopically reflect these processes. From this model,
we built a penalized pseudo-likelihood, which is used for
selecting who infected whom (or who is closely related to
whom). Two hypotheses (H1 and H2) were considered for
the penalization. H1: The penalization assesses whether the
contributions of sequences in S0 to explain sequences in S are
homogeneous (two penalization shapes were introduced
in this case: H1-normal and H1-x2). H2: The penalization
assesses whether the distance between sequences in S and
their contributing sequences in S0 is consistent with some
known features, e.g. with an expected value for this distance
(one penalization shape was introduced in this case: H2-
normal). In both cases, a penalization parameter measuresthe strength of the penalization, and this parameter is
calibrated with training data. In the epidemiological contexts
tackled in this study, training data consist of contact tracing
(who has been in contact with whom) or geographical dis-
tances between host units (that can be viewed as a contact
proxy). Contact information has to be available only for a
subset of hosts, hereafter called training hosts. Finally, for each
putative donor–recipient pair, our method provides a link
intensitymeasuringwhether the set S0 collected from the puta-
tive donor likely explains the set S collected from the recipient.
In addition, the link intensities can enable an assessment of the
uncertainty of the reconstruction of donor–recipient links.
Inwhat follows,we pave theway for this statistical learning
approach aiming at inferring transmissions of infectious
diseases (caused by fast-evolving pathogens) from deep
sequencing data, and we apply it to three real cases in
animal, human and plant epidemiology. The animal case
study concerns swine influenza virus (SIV) and here serves
as a test study since the transmission chain is partly known.
The human case study, dealing with Ebola, is a particularly
challenging situation since little diversity is observed in the
pathogen population and limited contact tracing information
is available. The plant case study concerns a potyvirus of
wild salsify transmitted by aphids where the host unit is the
meadow. In this latter application, we are more interested in
estimating who is closely related to whom than who infected
whom. The generic nature of SLAFEEL allows dealing with
diverse epidemiological situations and sequencing procedures,
as illustrated by the three case studies and in §3 of this article.2. Results
(a) Tracing experimental swine influenza outbreaks
The first dataset was generated from an experimentally
controlled transmission chain of SIV in pigs with different
immunological histories (naive and vaccinated; [2]). For each
chain, pairs of pigswere successively settled in an experimental
enclosure, with a temporal overlap between the arrival of the
new pair and the departure of the preceding pair to allow
the virus to be transmitted. Thus, the infection pathways are
partly known and will be used to assess the efficiency of SLA-
FEEL. For each pig, the virus population was sampled on a
daily basis, and multiple clones of the hemagglutinin gene
were sequenced using a capillary approach (Sanger sequen-
cing). The naive chain consisted of five pairs of pigs from
which 21 samples of the viral populations were collected
with multiple time points for eight pigs. The vaccinated
chain consisted of seven groups of pigs fromwhich 29 samples
of the viral populations were collected with multiple time
points for seven pigs. Further details about the SIV dataset
are provided in electronic supplementary material, table S1.
Transmission chains were inferred for the two experimen-
tal outbreaks with SLAFEEL. The penalization was calibrated
for each outbreak with contact information from two training
hosts, which were either the two pigs of the last group of
the outbreak or a pig from the third group and a pig from
the fourth group. The training hosts and the hosts with
which they have been in contact, including the host in the
same group, are detailed in electronic supplementary
material, table S2. For this application, we chose the H1-
normal penalization (see §4b) that led to higher consistency
between contact information and inferred transmissions.
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Figure 1. Transmissions inferred in the naive and vaccinated chains with two different pairs of training hosts for calibrating the penalization. Panel (a) corresponds
to the naive chain using pair 106–112 as training hosts (i.e. the last group of the chain); (b) naive chain, pair 111–108; (c) vaccinated chain, pair 400–413 (i.e. the
last group of the chain); (d ) vaccinated chain, pair 401–416. Training hosts are written in bold. The thickness of each arrow is proportional to the intensity of the
corresponding inferred link. (Online version in colour.)
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3For each host, the response set of sequences was the first
sample collected from this host, and the potential explanatory
sets of sequences were every sample collected earlier or at the
same time from all the other hosts.
Figure 1 shows transmissions inferred with SLAFEEL
for the naive and vaccinated chains. For the naive chain,
we observe rather consistent estimations with the two
pairs of training hosts, even if we observe variation in
secondary links with low intensities displayed with thin
arrows (the link intensity measures the likelihood of the
link; see §4c). By contrast, for the vaccinated chain, the train-
ing hosts have an impact on the inference. Indeed, the use of
training hosts in the last group leads to the identification
of many indirect links as transmissions, whereas the useof training hosts in the middle of the chain reduces this
shortcoming (even if the sources for hosts 403, 406, 412 and
414 remain inadequately inferred). Electronic supplementary
material, figure S1 shows how this uncertainty is also
reduced by adding a third training host to the last group.
Using more contact information allows a finer calibration
of the penalization (electronic supplementary material,
figure S2) and, consequently, a more accurate resolution
of transmissions. Moreover, the advantage of introducing
a penalization is clearly illustrated by electronic supplemen-
tary material, figure S3, which displays transmissions
estimated without penalization: for the naive chain, host
113 is erroneously identified as the source of infection of
numerous hosts.
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Figure 2. Estimated intensities of links for all recipients (a; vertical line: median intensity) and for each recipient in the training set of hosts (b– f; vertical lines:
intensity for the source identified with contact tracing). This figure was obtained from the combined analysis of 31 sequence fragments and with cross-validation.
Analogous figures obtained without cross-validation and with half of the fragments are given in electronic supplementary material, figures S6–S8. The second half
of fragments led to approximately the same results for training hosts. Note in addition that using only one fragment for inferring transmissions led to particularly
stochastic outputs. (Online version in colour.)
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4(b) Inferring Ebola epidemiological links despite low
pathogen diversity
In this section, we analyse the dataset generated during the
2014 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in Sierra Leone
[23]. We were able to include in our analysis 58 confirmed
EVD patients, from which within-host populations of the
virus were collected and sequenced. This number of patients
represents nearly 50% of the EVD patients diagnosed in
Sierra Leone from late May to mid-June. Viral populations
were sequenced using the Nextera library construction
method and Illumina sequencing and the haplotypes were
estimated in a sliding window of 1000 bases every 500
bases using Predict-Haplo [24].
More details about the Ebola dataset are provided in
electronic supplementary material, table S1. Here, we
simply highlight the rather low pathogen diversity that
was observed: on average, 16.1 haplotypes per fragment of
1000 bases were identified for the 58 patients included
in the analysis (s.d. ¼ 8.0), and 1.37 haplotypes per fragment
of 1000 bases per patient (s.d. ¼ 0.64).
Epidemiological links between patients were inferred by
calibrating the penalization with contact tracing published
in [25]. We were able to use five donor–recipient training
pairs identified with contact tracing (see electronic sup-
plementary material, table S2), four of them having thesame putative donor. For this application, we chose the H2-
normal penalization (see §4b), which led to higher consist-
ency between contact information and inferred
transmissions in a situation where observed pathogen popu-
lations show relatively low levels of diversity. Several
samples were available for some of the patients collected at
different time points [23]. These samples were merged in
our analysis to increase the within-host sequence diversity.
In addition, we applied the statistical learning approach sep-
arately for 31 partly overlapping fragments of 1000
nucleotides, and we aggregated the results for reconstructing
the epidemiological links. For each host, potential sources
were inferred among patients observed earlier than or at
the same time as the target host (point discussed in §3).
Because of the reduced pathogen diversity, the inferred
intensities of epidemiological links are generally quite low
(figure 2a) and multiple sources for any host are plausible
(except those at the earlier time points of sampling
for which only a few potential sources are allowed). Thus,
source identification is quite uncertain. Figure 2b– f shows
the distributions of the link intensities with plausible sources
for the five recipients in the training data, and give the ranks
of their sources identified with contact tracing. The intensities
and ranks were inferred with a leave-one-out cross-validation
approach (i.e. the host of interest in each panel is removed
from the training data when one infers its source and the
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Figure 3. Most likely epidemiological links cumulating to 20% probability for each recipient (i.e. for each recipient, potential donors were ranked with respect to link
intensity, and the subset of donors with higher ranks for whom the sum of link intensities reached 0.2 were displayed on the graph). (Online version in colour.)
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5rank of its donor based on contact-tracing). The donors
identified with contact tracing are well ranked for patients
G3820, G3821, G3823 and G3851, but not for G3817. The
pathogen population collected from the latter patient is
actually quite different from the population observed in
its putative donor G3729 (see electronic supplementary
material, table S3, and the Ebola phylogeny built from the
consensus sequences [26]). Thus, the epidemiological link
between G3817 and G3729 could be revisited by focusing
on patients who are more closely connected to G3817 than
G3729 (see electronic supplementary material, tables S4–
S8). Figure 3 displays the most likely epidemiological links
cumulating to 20% of probability for each recipient (see
figure caption). Patients are clustered based on their chief-
doms, whose locations are provided in electronic
supplementary material, figure S4. The Jawie chiefdom
seems to be an interface between Kissi Teng and Kissi
Tongi chiefdoms on the one hand and most of the other chief-
doms on the other hand. Based on temporal data (electronic
supplementary material, figure S5), the Kissi Teng and Kissi
Tongi chiefdoms include mostly early cases and, therefore,
individuals in Jawie chiefdom may have played the role of
a relay in the outbreak.
(c) Assessing epidemiological links at the
metapopulation scale
This dataset was generated from a wild plant species
(Tragopogon pratensis, hereafter called wild salsify), which is
a reservoir for a potyvirus closely related to the endive
necrotic mosaic virus (ENMV; [27]). Within-host virus var-
iants were sequenced from 189 infected host plantssampled in 2014 in a 4010 km region of south-eastern
France. High-throughput sequencing was applied on viral
PCR amplicons (final length: 438 bp of the capsid gene)
using the Illumina technology [28]. Sequence data were
merged at the scale of the patch (i.e. meadows, agricultural
fields or urbanized areas) with the aim of assessing epide-
miological links between a subset of the metapopulation
formed by the potyvirus (the 189 sampled plants were dis-
tributed in 27 patches). Further details about this dataset
are provided in electronic supplementary material, table S1.
Epidemiological links between sampled patches were
inferred by calibrating the penalization with information on
inter-patch distances, assuming that, on average, geographi-
cally close host patches are infected by similar viral variants
(isolation-by-distance process). Here, the H1-x2 penalization
(see §4b) was chosen because it led to a lower average
distance between connected patches (see criterion (4.7), §4c).
Figure 4 shows the inferred links between sampled
patches. Here, all the optimal values for the penalization
parameter (shown in electronic supplementary material,
figure S9) led to the same set of links and, therefore, no
secondary arrows are displayed (electronic supplementary
material, figure S10 shows links inferred without penaliza-
tion). Even if most links are relatively short compared to
the mean distance between sampled patches (see electronic
supplementary material, figure S11), there is a non-negligible
proportion of long links that could be the signature of the
long-distance dispersal ability of the aphid to transmit the
virus. Additionally, common environmental conditions and
host demography and genetics at the scale of the study area
may partly explain the inferred long-distance links. Indeed,
environmental conditions constrain host local abundance
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Figure 4. Links inferred between salsify patches based on sampled sets of potyvirus sequences (a; links from the same source have the same colour) and dis-
tribution of link distances (b; the vertical red line gives the mean distance). (Online version in colour.)
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6and, therefore, genetic drift impacts on the levels of diversity
and differentiation within and between local pathogen popu-
lations. Spatial variation in host genetics may also shape
the spatial structure of pathogen populations by selecting
different variants regardless of the distance between host
patches [29,30].(d) Benchmarking SLAFEEL
We first compared SLAFEEL and BadTrIP [5] for influenza
data to assess the ability of both methods to identify infection
pathways that are partly known. Electronic supplementary
material, figure S12, gives details about the application of
BadTrIP and shows inferred transmission trees. Whatever
training hosts were used, SLAFEEL generally performed
better than BadTrIP with respect to the proportion of correct
source identifications (that focuses on the most likely inferred
source) and the average Jeffreys discrepancy (that compares
the probabilities for any recipient host to be linked with
any putative source) as presented in electronic supplementary
material, table S10.
Second, we compared the transmissions inferred with
SLAFEEL from the Ebola data and those obtained in [5]
with BadTrIP. Here, we assessed the consistency of both
estimations (since potential infection pathways are not
known, unlike in the influenza case study). The most likely
sources are the same for 8% of recipient hosts (electronic
supplementary material, table S10) and the most likely
sources inferred with SLAFEEL are among the 10 most
likely sources identified with BadTrIP for almost 50% of
recipients (electronic supplementary material, figure S13).
These rather low percentages may be explained by the low
pathogen diversity in this study, leading to generally quite
low inferred link intensities with SLAFEEL and, to a lesser
extent, with BadTrIP (see electronic supplementary material,
figure B in [5]). They may also be explained by the assump-
tions made and the constraints imposed in [5], where
information from sampling dates, nucleotide frequencies
and sequencing coverage was used, and where the introduc-
tion date (removal date) of each host was specified as its
sampling date minus (plus) 21 days, thus allowing each
host to be infected at most 21 days before being sampled,
and to infect others at most 21 days after being sampled.
Finally, we simulated 1000 datasets with the SEEDY
package (simulation of evolutionary and epidemiologicaldynamics; [20]) by using parameter values chosen by
Worby and Read to generate their 4th figure (mean epidemic
size: 26.6 infected hosts (s.d. ¼ 2.3); 10 virus genomes
sampled per host). The SEEDY package allows not only the
generation of datasets, but also a very fast inference of trans-
missions given infection times, the mutation rate, the
equilibrium viral population size within host and the trans-
mission bottleneck size, which are generally not known
in practice. Thus, we used SEEDY-based inferences of
transmissions as a benchmark, and assessed how SLAFEEL
compares with SEEDY in identifying the true source for
each recipient of each of the 1000 simulated outbreaks. For
the application of SLAFEEL to each simulated outbreak,
we randomly drew four training hosts whose sources were
supposed to be known, and we chose the H1-normal penali-
zation. On average, the most likely inferred source was
correct for 39% [20–61%] of recipients with SEEDY and
36% [17–60%] with SLAFEEL (electronic supplementary
material, figure S14). Therefore, in this simulation setting,
SLAFEEL performs almost as well as SEEDY.3. Discussion
We introduced an exploratory approach, called SLAFEEL, for
quantitatively investigating epidemiological links between
host units from deep sequencing data. This versatile
approach, grounded on statistical learning, is adaptable to
diverse contexts and data. Here, we applied it to analyse
virus dynamics in humans, animals and plants at different
spatial scales (e.g. individuals and fields) using data obtained
with different sequencing techniques and showing different
levels of pathogen diversity. The relatively broad applica-
bility of SLAFEEL implies that, in some contexts, links have
to be interpreted in a conservative way: typically, in the sal-
sify potyvirus application, we did not infer who infected
whom but who is closely related to whom. Using the pseudo-
evolutionary model and the associated inference approach
for estimating epidemiological links should be particularly
valuable in non-standard situations where classical mechan-
istic assumptions may be erroneous and when sequencing
and variant calling issues may be misleading. The key prop-
erty underlying our procedure is the combination of a
learning stage and a penalization that can be used to con-
strain what is a link. This is expected to help in
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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7appropriately dealing with sequencing errors because such
errors should be accounted for non-training hosts as they
are for training hosts. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the
impact of sequencing errors on inference accuracy should
be formally assessed in simulation studies.
The training stage can use classical information such as
contact tracing data [25], but also contact proxies such as
geographical distances between host units, connectivities
via air masses for airborne pathogens [31] and social
connections [4,32]. To get a contact proxy, one could also
infer some transmissions with a (generally more time-
consuming) mechanistic approach from a subset of observed
cases and use the estimated transmissions as training data
in our approach applied to the whole dataset. Thus, the
mechanistic approach and SLAFEEL would be complemen-
tary. Whatever the way that contact information (or
proxies) are gathered, it can be conjectured that the closer
the relationship between contact information and epidemio-
logical links, the more informative the training stage.
Moreover, the possibility of using very diverse types of con-
tact information in the learning stage of SLAFEEL reinforces
its broad relevance to human, animal and plant diseases.
When geographical proximity is used for calibrating
the penalization (like in the potyvirus application), short-
distance links may be favoured, and the inferred distribution
of distances between linked host units hence has to be
interpreted with caution. However, in our procedure,
geographical proximity is only used after a genetic-based
selection of possible configurations: basically, the penalized
pseudo-likelihood function (only based on virus sequence
data) allows us to eliminate genetically unlikely configur-
ations; then, in the learning stage, spatial information is
used to select the most likely configurations within the set
of genetically likely configurations, building on the following
grounds: among two equally genetically likely configur-
ations, the one showing links at shorter distances is more
likely (because of the very classical assumption that ‘dispersal
is more probable at short distance than at long distance’).
Thus, inferring only short-distance links can be interpreted
as: ‘short distance dispersal is sufficient to explain the genetic
spatial pattern of the pathogen’. By contrast, inferring both
(i) a mixture of short- and long-distance links and
(ii) unlinked nearby host units (like in the potyvirus appli-
cation) suggests that isolation by distance does not hold at
the study scale, and that the assumption ‘dispersal is more
probable at short distance than at long distance’ is perturbed
by other drivers (e.g. host genetics), which significantly
impact the genetic spatial pattern of the pathogen. Finally,
while our analysis in the potyvirus application leads to inter-
pretable results, cross-validation or data-splitting (into
training and prediction data) could be applied in further
studies to strengthen the analysis conclusions when
geographical proximity is used as contact information.
The main objective of this article was to present how
statistical learning can be applied for inferring transmissions
(or epidemiological links from a conservative perspective)
and to examine if such an approach has the potential to be
efficient. Results obtained for swine influenza (where the
transmission pathways are partly known) and for outbreaks
simulated with SEEDY [20] are encouraging. However,
further research is required to make the method robust and
able to pass a battery of simulation tests such as the one
designed for assessing the performance of BadTrIP [5]. Thefollowing questions should be specifically investigated
using simulations. How does the efficiency and speed of
the method scale up with big data? How does the method
perform at various sequencing depths (considering a single
haplotype for each host as a special case)? How does the
method perform in the presence of contamination and
sequencing errors (PHYLOSCANNER [14] explicitly handles
such issues)? What is the sensitivity of the method to the hap-
lotype reconstruction tool (e.g. comparing Predict-Haplo
that we used for the Ebola data with SAVAGE [33] and
MLEHaplo [34])? How is SLAFEEL accuracy improved
with increasing training information? How can we exploit
negative training information (i.e. infected hosts that are
known to not have been in contact with certain infected
hosts)? How does the method perform in the presence of
severe bottlenecks during transmissions, in comparison
with approaches exploiting phylogenetic signals that are
particularly adapted to such situations [9]?
Before testing SLAFEEL in the latter range of simulation
settings, further research should especially focus on the
penalization function. Here, we introduced three shapes
corresponding to different hypotheses (see §4b), but the
penalization could be tuned by considering other hypotheses,
which could help circumvent the current limitations of our
approach. For instance, the penalization could be improved
to take into account (i) the timing, thus constraining the set
of likely sources for each host based on observation times
and possibly additional temporal information like data on
infectious periods [17], (ii) fixed sub-clonal haplotypes
(including haplotypes with stop codons) by forcing the selec-
tion algorithm to pair host units sharing such haplotypes
[1,35] and (iii) sample sizes to avoid biases induced by differ-
ent levels of observed diversity. Specific penalizations could
also be designed to better infer the direction of epidemiologi-
cal links when temporal data do not discriminate sufficiently.
For example, the signature of the link direction could be
identified in the genetic training data and incorporated into
the penalization function. Other limitations are more difficult
to tackle, e.g. de novo mutations at the same site (homo-
plasy), recombinations, insufficient sequencing depth and
lack of sequence diversity, which can lead to uncertainty in
the inferences. However, the advantage of our statistical
learning approach is that the uncertainty can be objectively
assessed on training data. The uncertainty (and potential
bias) can even be assessed using cross-validation to prevent
over-fitting. The assessment of uncertainty and bias in the
inference of links is also an objective way to select the pena-
lization shape. However, we must warn that, if training data
are not representative of the whole population, learning
model parameters from training data may induce errors in
the selection of the penalization and, ultimately, in the recon-
struction of epidemiological links (such misleading training
data would be analogous to misleading assumptions in
mechanistic approaches).
Another important perspective is the implementation
of an efficient computer code. The R code that we developed
(available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1410438)
allowed us to test different model specifications, to exploit
genetic data from multiple sequence fragments and to per-
form cross-validation in a limited time-span (e.g. a
SLAFEEL run for the swine influenza case study or for a
sequence fragment in the Ebola case study took approxi-
mately 10–20 minutes with a laptop computer, whereas
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
8BadTrIP takes several days; see caption of electronic sup-
plementary material, figure S12 and [5]). However,
implementing further improvements in the code should
allow us (i) to include multiple infections in transmission
scenarios where an explanatory set of sequences would consist
of a weighted mixture of several samples collected from sev-
eral putative sources, (ii) to select a penalization shape among
a large library of functions, and (iii) to tackle big data (e.g.
large numbers of cases and sequence fragments). Concerning
point (iii), our approach based on a simplified representation
of dependencies between observations via a statistical
regression model is a commonly used approach to handle
big data [36].Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
374:201802584. Methods
To infer transmissions of a virus (or, more generally, epidemiologi-
cal links) within a host population, we built a pseudo-evolutionary
model that concisely describes transitions between sets of
sequences sampled from different host units, and used this
model to select probable source–recipient pairs. In what follows,
we provide the outline of our method in one of its simplest
forms (see also electronic supplementary material, figure S15),
then we technically describe it in its general form by presenting
first the model and second the inference.
(a) Outline of the SLAFEEL approach
Let us consider one of the possible source–recipient pairs. For
each virus sequence collected from the recipient, we compute
the genetic distance (namely, the number of different nucleo-
tides) to each sequence collected from the source, and we
identify the nearest sequence(s). By applying this procedure to
all sequences from the recipient, we can compute the contri-
bution of each sequence from the source to explain the viral
population observed from the recipient. This contribution relates
to the number of times that this sequence from the source is
identified as the nearest sequence (see the exact definition in
§4b). Then, a parametric kernel function, derived from the
Jukes–Cantor micro-evolutionary process and embedded in a
pseudo-likelihood, is used to assess how much each sequence
from the recipient is explained by its nearest sequence(s) from
the source. Moreover, a parametric penalization function is
used to assess how likely sequences from the source have been
uniformly subsampled to generate sequences from the recipient
(this is assessed based on the contributions calculated above).
Thus, for each possible source–recipient pair, we compute a
penalized pseudo-likelihood parameterized by the kernel
parameter m and the penalization parameter u. The penalized
pseudo-likelihood will be high for a putative source–recipient
pair if (i) all sequences from the recipient have genetic neigh-
bours in the source and (ii) sequences from the source equally
contribute in expectation to the set of sequences collected from
the recipient. Note that condition (ii) depends on the rationale
underlying the form chosen for the penalization function
(here, the penalization is grounded on a uniform subsampling
hypothesis).
The balance between the pseudo-likelihood and the penaliza-
tion is tuned in two steps. First, we estimate m, for each source–
recipient pair and each u value in a set Q of candidate values,
by maximizing the penalized pseudo-likelihood with respect to
m; then, for each recipient and each u value, the source leading
to the maximum penalized pseudo-likelihood is identified as
the most likely source given u. Second, adopting a learning
approach, we calibrate the penalization by selecting the u
values leading to the maximum proportion of training hosts for
which the most likely sources conditional on u are consistentwith contact information. The link intensity between a given
recipient and a possible source is measured by the proportion
of selected u values for which the source has been identified as
the most likely source.
The dual form of the penalized pseudo-likelihood and the
learning stage are essential to distinguish ‘A infected B’, ‘B
infected A’ and ‘C infected B’ when only the former statement
is true. Indeed, the pseudo-likelihood tends to impose that each
sequence from the recipient must have a neighbour sequence in
its source, which should exclude ‘C infected B’; the penalization
tends to impose that the set of sequences from the recipient has
been generated by a subsample of the set of sequences from
the source (if the penalization has been built in this way),
which should exclude ‘B infected A’; the learning stage is
expected to determine the adequate relative weights of the
pseudo-likelihood and the penalization for obtaining satisfactory
inference of epidemiological links. The learning stage can even be
exploited to design an adequate penalization form (one should
prefer a penalization form leading to higher inference accuracy
for training hosts).
(b) Pseudo-evolutionary model for the evolution and
transmission of populations of sequences
The method outlined above is grounded on a pseudo-
evolutionary model, which concisely describes transitions
between sets of sequences sampled from different host units.
The general form of the pseudo-evolutionary model is given by
the following penalized pseudo-likelihood for the transition
from an explanatory set of I sequences S(0)1 , . . . , S
(0)
I to a response
set of J sequences S1, . . ., SJ (haplotype copies are explicitly
incorporated in these sets of sequences):
f (S1, . . . , SJ j S(0)1 , . . . , S(0)I )¼ P(W)
YJ
j¼1
PI
i¼1wijK(d(g(Sj), g(S
(0)
i )))PI
i¼1wij
 !
,
(4:1)
where each term in the product represents the pseudo-
probability of obtaining the response sequence Sj given the
explanatory sequences S(0)1 , . . . , S
(0)
I and the values of w1j, . . .,
wIj; g is a transformation of sequences (e.g. aiming at reducing
the dimension of the space of viral sequences); K is a kernel func-
tion and d is a pseudo-distance function introduced to account
for unsampled sequences in the source of infection, the evolution
of new viral variants and possible sequencing errors; wij
are weights accounting for the loss of virus variants during
within-host evolution and between-host transmission; W is the
(I  J )-matrix of weights whose element (i, j ) is wij; and P(W )
is a penalty for the weight matrix W potentially allowing the
incorporation of knowledge on virus evolution and transmission
(e.g. on the strength of the transmission bottleneck).
In this article, we focus on a simple semi-parametric version
of (4.1) where (i) each sequence Sj is only explained by the closest
sequence(s) S(0)i in terms of the number of different nucleotides
and (ii) the penalization measures the discrepancy from a null
hypothesis to be specified. Thus, the pseudo-evolutionary
model given by equation (4.1) reduces to:
fm,u (S1, . . . , SJ j S(0)1 , . . . , S(0)I )
¼ Pu(W)
YJ
j¼1
PI
i¼1 wijKm{d(S j, S
(0)
i ); Dij}PI
i¼1 wij
 !
, (4:2)
where d(  ,  ) gives the number of different nucleotides between
two sequences; wij¼ 1/nj for indices i corresponding to sequences
S(0)i minimally distant from sequence Sj, i.e. such that
d(S j, S
(0)
i ) ¼ min {d(S j, S(0)i0 ) : i0 ¼ 1, . . . , I}, the number of such
sequences being denoted nj, wij ¼ 0 otherwise (therefore,PI
i¼1 wij ¼ 1); Dij is the duration separating the two sequences
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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(0)
i ; Km(  ; D) is the probability distribution function
(p.d.f.) of the binomial law with size L (i.e. sequence length)
and success probability 3(12 exp (24mD))/4, corresponding to
the Jukes–Cantor micro-evolutionary process over a duration D
and with a substitution parameter m; and Pu(W) is a parametric
penalization measuring the likelihood of the contributions of
explanatory sequences S(0)1 , . . . , S
(0)
I (measured by
PJ
j¼1 wij, i ¼
1, . . ., I) to the response set of sequences S1, . . ., SJ. IfPJ
j¼1 wij ¼ 0, then sequence S(0)i does not contribute to explaining
the sequences collected from the recipient and, therefore, may be
considered as lost during within-host evolution or between-host
transmission.
We consider the three following shapes for Pu. The
H1-normal shape measures the discrepancy between
PJ
j¼1 wij
and its expected value J/I under the uniform (but not necessarily
independent) sampling hypothesis by
Pu(W) ¼
YI
i¼1
F
XJ
j¼1
wij;
J
I
, u
J
I
1 1
I
 0@
1
A, (4:3)
where F (  ; a, b2) is the p.d.f. of the normal law with mean a and
variance b2, and u( J/I )(1 2 1/I ) is proportional to the multino-
mial variance up to the over-dispersion parameter u . 0. The
uniform sampling hypothesis amounts to assuming that explana-
tory sequences have equal chances to contribute to the set of
response sequences. With J response sequences, there are J
draws of an explanatory sequence (one for each response
sequence) among I explanatory sequences. Thus, under the
uniform sampling hypothesis, the total contribution
PJ
j¼1 wij of
the explanatory sequence S(0)i has expectation J/I.
The H1-x2 shape measures the discrepancy between
PJ
j¼1 wij
and its expected value J/I by
Pu(W) ¼ ux2
XI
i¼1
PJ
j¼1 wij  J=I
 2
J=I
; I  1
0
B@
1
CA, (4:4)
where x2(  ; I  1) is the p.d.f. of the x2 law with I 2 1 degrees of
freedom, and u . 0 measures the influence of the penalization.
The H2-normal shape can be used when estimates of the
mean and standard deviation of the distance between any
sequence collected from any recipient host and the closest
sequence collected from its source, say dobs and s2obs, are available
(these estimates can be obtained from contact tracing data). The
H2-normal shape measures how likely it is that this mean dis-
tance for the host unit of interest is drawn from the normal
distribution with mean dobs and variance s2obs:
Pu(W) ¼ u
YJ
j¼1
F
XI
i¼1
wijd(S j, S
(0)
i );
dobs, s2obs
 !
, (4:5)
where u. 0 measures the influence of the penalization.
Thereafter and whatever the penalization shape, u is called
the penalization parameter.
(c) Estimation and calibration of parameters, and
inference of transmissions
Consider M sets of sequences S1, . . ., SM collected from M host
units. In a first step, for each set of sequences Sm and each value
of u in a finite set Q to be specified, the penalized pseudo-likeli-
hoods fm,u(SmjSm0), for m0 = m, are maximized with respect to m
(let m^m0 (u) denote the maximizer, i.e. the estimate, of m). The
most likely source for host unit m given u, say s^(m; u), is then
the host unit m0 leading to the highest value of fm^m0 (u),u(Sm j Sm0 ):
s^(m; u) ¼
m0=m
argmax fm^m0 (u),u(Sm j Sm0 ):In a second step, the penalization parameter u is calibrated
by building and optimizing a criterion that compares contact
information and inferred sources of infection s^(m; u), for m in
a set M , {1, . . . , M} of training hosts (this procedure can
also be used in practice to select a penalization shape among
a set of candidate functions as those proposed in equations
(4.3)– (4.5)). Driven by the applications in this study, we intro-
duce the two following criteria. First, consider the case where
contact information consists of tracing contacts for hosts
m [M. We define the criterion to be maximized as the pro-
portion of inferred transmissions that are consistent with
contact tracing:
~Q ¼
u[Q
argmax
1
jMj
X
m[M
1(^s(m; u) [ Cm), (4:6)
where jMj is the number of elements inM; 1(E) ¼ 1 if event E is
true, zero otherwise; and Cm is the set of hosts in f1, . . ., Mg that
have been in contact with m. Second, consider the case where con-
tact information consists of the geographical distances between
hosts in the training setM , {1, . . . , M}. We define the criterion
to be minimized as the average distance between the train-
ing hosts and their inferred sources (if the sources are in the
training set):
~Q ¼
u[Q
argmin
P
m[M d(m, s^(m; u))1{^s(m; u) [M}P
m[M 1{^s(m; u) [M}
, (4:7)
where d(m, s^(m; u)) is the geographical distance between host m
and its suspected source s^(m; u). Note that, in both cases, ~Q may
be a set of values (and not only a single value) if the criterion is opti-
mal for several u inQ. This was the case in the applications that we
tackled, since criteria in (4.6) and (4.7) have values in very limited
discrete sets (e.g. f0, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, 1g in the Ebola application).
Thus, in each application, ~Q was obtained by computing the cri-
terion on a regular grid of u values and by retaining only values
maximizing the criterion. We observed that small variations in u
did not impact the criterion value, aswell as link intensities defined
below in (4.8), and themesh size of the gridwas tuned accordingly.
In further applications, the grid search could be improved in two
directions: first, one could use an iterative numerical algorithm
for the optimization; second, one could replace the maximum/
minimum rule by a quantile rule (i.e. using a tolerance threshold).
In a third step, we assess the intensity of the link between m
and m0 in f1, . . ., Mg by the proportion of values of u in ~Q for
which s^(m; u) coincides with m0:
1
j~Qj
X
u[~Q
1{^s(m; u) ¼ m0}, (4:8)
where j~Qj is the number of elements in ~Q. This intensity of the
link between two host units is used to infer who infected
whom or, from a more conservative perspective, who is the
most related with whom. When several sequence fragments are
available (like in the Ebola case study), the link intensity defined
in equation (4.8) is computed for each fragment, and then
averaged to obtain the overall link intensity. Future work could
explore alternatives to the average (e.g. robust mean and
median) for assessing link intensities from several fragments.
Model and inference specifications that were used for the
three case studies are summarized in electronic supplementary
material, table S9.
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